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Corbello v. Iowa Production and the Implications of
Restoration Damages in Louisiana: Drilling Holes in
Deep Pockets for Thirty-Three Million Dollars
INTRODUCTION

In 2003, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a decision that sent
shock waves throughout the legal profession and the oil and gas
community-both in Louisiana and the surrounding states. That
landmark decision was Corbello v. Iowa Production.' Before the
Corbellodecision, the oil and gas industry believed that the remedy
for damage to property would be similar to the remedy in a tort claim.
Therefore, damages would equal the value of the thing, not the cost
to rebuild or restore the thing. Such a proposition was thought to be
supported by Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New
Orleans v. LouisianaGas Service, Company,2 where the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the remedy for damage to property in tort
claims should be limited to the fair market value of the property, with
certain exceptions. Louisiana landowners, on the other hand,
believed that the remedy for damage to property was determined by
the language in the contract and that the actual value of the property
had absolutely no bearing on the amount of damages to be paid. So,
if a contract called for restoration of the property, then the property
must be restored-no matter what the costs associated with the
restoration.
In Corbello v. Iowa Production,Shell Oil Company breached a
contract provision in a lease to "reasonably restore the land to its
original condition." 3 The Court had to determine whether the remedy
for breach of the contract should be measured in terms of: 1) the cost
to repair; 2) the diminution in value; or 3) the replacement cost minus
depreciation.4 The Corbello Court ultimately upheld an award for
"cost to repair" the surface of the plaintiff's land and the potential
contamination of an aquifer damaged by saltwater injections.5 The
damages amounted to $33 million, a value 300 times greater than the
fair market value of the land.6 Included in the $33 million award, $28
million was awarded for the potential contamination of the aquifer-a
public injury.7 The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision contradicts
years of prior jurisprudence and legal commentary concerning not
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
1. 2002-0826 (La. 2003), 850 So. 2d 686.
2. 618 So. 2d 874 (La. 1993).
3. 850 So. 2d at 686.
4. Id. at 694.

5.
6.

Id. at 696.
Id.

7.

Id. at 697.
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only the amount of allowable damages, but also the very raisond'etre
of damages. 8
The Corbellodecision is likely to be regarded as momentous, in
part, because the ruling implicates multiple areas of law and policy,
including the law regarding breach of contract, environmental law,
measurement of damages, and the appropriateness of compensating
a private party for a public injury. The Corbello Court was faced
with several opposing policy considerations. A damage award limited
to the fair market value or diminution in value of the land might
encourage the flagrant breach of contractual "restoration" provisions
if such a breach is considered efficient from an economic standpoint.
Conversely, an award exceeding the market value and diminution in
value of the land would translate into a windfall for the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, awarding damages for the speculative nature of the
injury might lead oil and gas companies to reconsider doing business
in the state due to the increased risk of adverse judgments against
them.
However, not awarding damages for the possible
contamination could lead to under-compensation if the aquifer was
actually contaminated. Finally, the allocation of damages to a private
party for the aquifer may be more likely to lead to restoration since
the regulatory agencies charged with that duty are "understaffed and
underfunded. . . to oppose the oil companies." 9 On the other hand,
the plaintiffs have no duty to restore the property or the aquifer with
the award, unlike the state agencies who have a duty and interest in
the public health and the environmental safeness of the property in
the state.
This comment addresses the issues set forth in Corbello,
examining the Court's reasoning in light of civil law doctrine, prior
Louisiana case law, and common law approaches. Particular
attention is devoted to the appropriate measurement and allocation of
damages.10 Section I presents a comparative analysis of damages
awarded under contract and tort theories in Louisiana and common
law jurisdictions. In section II, the comment reviews the facts and
analysis from the Corbellodecision and its implications, examining
the costs and benefits resulting from the decision. Section III
discusses the implications that the Corbello decision carries with it,
examining the costs and benefits resulting from the decision. It
further addresses whether an alternative remedy, such as specific
performance, would increase the efficiency and effectiveness from an
8. For an overview on the reason damages exist, see Saul Litvinoff,
Obligations § 3.1, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1999).
9. Corbello,850 So. 2d at 701.
10. Due process limitations upon damages are also an important topic
concerning Corbello,however, they are beyond the scope of this comment.
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economic standpoint, thereby enhancing the social wealth and needs
of Louisiana. It also suggests that compensating a private party for a
public injury, with the mere hope that the party will clean the
property, is an insufficient and unreliable method of: 1) protecting
the public from the possible harm, 2) compensating the public for its
injury, and 3) restoring contaminated land to an acceptable condition.
Section IV then reviews both the positive aspects and the underlying
flaws of the "Ground Water Remediation" statute, which was passed
by the legislature in response to the Corbellodecision.
Ultimately, this comment recommends that the courts perform a
flexible balancing test, weighing the economic and social benefits and
disadvantages against each other when determining restoration costs
for damage to the surface of land. If the injured landowner may be
sufficiently compensated through monetary damages and substitutes
are available in the market, then the court should limit damages to the
fair market value of the land. Alternatively, where permanent and
dangerous environmental damage and potential injury to the public is
involved, such as contamination of groundwater, a different approach
is warranted. It is the task of the environmental agencies of the state
to ensure the safety and well-being of the state and those agencies
should be the first to remediate the contamination caused by lessors.
However, when the landowners do not seek appropriate relief from
the agencies or the agencies fail to adequately remedy the situation,
the courts should award specific performance (overseen by the
supervision of an appropriate regulatory agency) thereby enforcing
the obligation to restore the land and requiring the breaching party to
clean up its own mess. 12
I. BASIC CONTRACT LAW AND RESTORATION DAMAGES:
DIMINUTION IN VALUE, COST TO RESTORE, AND FAIR MARKET
VALUE

Determining the proper measure of damages has been a recurring
issue when an obligor breaches an obligation or defectively performs.
While Louisiana law was previously in accord with the laws of her
common-law-sister-states with respect to the assessment of damages
for breach of contract and tortious conduct, the Corbello decision
threatens to disrupt that harmony. The following sections provide a
brief overview of the historical development of damages and their
measurement.
11.

2003 La. Acts No. 1166, La. R.S. 2015.1: 30 (2003).

12.

See Robert Fulghum, All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten,

cited in Respondent's brief, Corbello,850 So. 2d 686.

274

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

A. The Purposeof Remedies: An Overview of the Common and
Civil Law Approaches
In the common and civil law traditions, remedies indemnify an
obligee for both breach of contract and tortious conduct. 3 In contract
law, remedies encourage the promisee to enter contracts by ensuring
that he will be placed in a position similar to the position he would
have been in had the contract been performed. 4 Similarly, remedies
are awarded to tort victims as compensation for injuries caused to
them by the fault of another and operate to restore the plaintiff to the
position he occupied before the tort was committed. 15 Whether
reading jurisprudence, statutes, or legal commentary, the same
language repeatedly appears when discussing damages for both tort
and contract law: the plaintiff should be placed in as good of a
position as he would have been in had the tort or breach not occurred.
In contract terms, this is commonly referred to as the "expectation
interest" or the "benefit of the bargain."' 6
In the common law, remedies are not meant to encourage the
promisor to keep his promise, nor are they intended to punish the
breaching party.' 7 Common law courts typically indemnify the
injured party by awarding the expectation interest, thereby placing
him in as good of a position as he would have occupied had the
contract been performed.' 8 The expectation interest is the actual
value of the completed contract to the obligee, rather than the injured9
party's "expectation" at the time the parties entered the contract.
The common law uses various formulas to quantify the expectation
interest.20 Oftentimes, courts will calculate damages using two or
13. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, Second edition § 12.1
(1998); Marcel Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil, no. 221 (Louisiana State
Law Institute trans., 12th ed. 1939).
14. See Farnsworth, supranote 13, § 12.1.
15. See Frank Maraist & Thomas Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law § 7-1 (1996).
"These damages are typically called compensatory damages. Compensatory
damages are divided into two groups: special damages and general damages.
Special damages are those that must be specially pled and have a 'ready market
value.' General damages are inherently speculative in nature and cannot be fixed
with mathematical certainty, including pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, and, possibly, future medical expenses and future lost wages."

Id. § 7-2.
16. See generallyPhilip Bruner & Patrick O'Connor, Bruner and O'Connor on
Construction Law § 19 (2002).
17. See Farnsworth, supranote 13, § 12.1.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. Diminution in value calculates damages based on a reduction in market
value that is caused by the breach. Restoration costs equals the value that it would
cost to actually complete the promised obligation. Courts will also award the loss
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more different valuation methods and award whichever results in the
least amount of economic waste.2 '
Louisiana's civil law tradition diverges from the common law in
its method of restoring the obligee to his original position. The civil
law typically prefers to impose specific performance, rather than
monetary damages for the failure to perform an obligation.22 The
civil law tradition operates under the fundamental premise that the
most effective way to protect a person's expectation interest is not
through monetary damages, but, rather, by requiring actual
performance. 23 There are, however, certain exceptions to this
preference of specific performance. First, civilian jurisdictions
typically refuse to impose specific performance for an "obligation to
do."'24 This hesitancy is a reaction to the principle that specific
performance should not infringe upon an obligor's personal freedom
and should not be awarded if there is a more convenient method of
restoring the obligee.25 Second, when specific performance is
in value minus depreciation.
21. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 348(2) (stating that the owner of
damaged property may recover the reasonable cost of completing performance, but
only if the cost is "not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value." When
such is the case, the owner should receive the diminished market value of the thing
damaged by the breach.); see alsoPlunk v. Hedrick Concrete Products, Corp., 870
S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. So. Dist. 1994); Vezina v. Nautilus Pools, Inc., 610 A.2d
1312, 1319 (Conn. App. 1992) (finding that "the cost of rectifying the defendant's
omission is so great in comparison to the cost of the purchase of the pool, the proper
measure of damages is the diminished value of the pool."); City Anderson, Indiana
v. Salling Concrete Corporation, 411 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. App. 1980).
22. See, e.g., La Civ. Code art. 1986. The comments to the article also
stipulate that if the obligor fails to perform an obligation to deliver, the court shall
grant specific performance to the obligee. Id. cmts.; see also Mente & Co., Inc. v.
Roane Sugars, Inc., 199 La. 686,6 So. 2d 731 (La. 1942); Oliver v. Home Service
Ice Co., 161 So. 766 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941). Note, however, that if the obligor
fails to perform an obligation to do, the decision to grant specific performance lies
within the discretion of the court. La. Civ. Code art. 1986. The civil law
recognizes the principle that one may not encroach upon the obligor's personal
freedom. La. Civ. Code art. 1986 cmt. (c).
23. La. Civ. Code art. 1986. See also Litvinoff, supranote 8, § 3.3.
24. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 1986; see also, Saul Litvinoff, Obligations §
162, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1975) ("... [W]hen specific performance
of an obligation requires a personal act of the obligor and he refuses to perform, the
obligee cannot be allowed to force him (manu militari)to act and must be content
with damages as a substitute performance (execution par equivalent). The timehonored adage nemo preacise cogi potest adfactum (no one can be forced to),
which expresses the idea underlying Article 1142 had, very probably, no other
meaning.").
25. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 1986; see also,Litvinoff, supranote 24, § 166
("According to principle, the court must grant specific performance [if the creditor
demands specific performance]. This is the normal remedy that conforms strictly
to the obligation and should, therefore, prevail over the substitute remedy. Such is
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impossible the courts will utilize other remedies.26 In such a case, the
obligor remains bound to make reparation for the obligee's loss
caused by his tort or breach.27 One way the obligor may do this is
through the payment of damages, which is defined as a pecuniary
compensation and the monetary equivalent for the loss sustained by
the injured party.28
In certain circumstances courts may award "punitive damages"
which serve the purpose of punishing the defendant. In common law
states, punitive damages may be awarded for intentional torts and
reckless or grossly negligent torts. In Louisiana, however, the
legislature has severely limited punitive damages.29 For example,
specific statutes allow punitive damages for injuries caused by the
reckless disregard of an intoxicated driver3" or for injuries relating to
criminal misconduct against a minor.3 ' Common law jurisdictions,
on the other hand, occasionally award punitive damages for
intentional breach of contract.32 In Louisiana, however, the only time
the view expressed by the consensus of French doctrine which looks upon damages
as a kind of consolation for the disappointed obligee. The French jurisprudence,
however, in a consistent way, allows the courts a large degree of discretion. They
may allow only damages to the creditor who seeks specific performance if theyfeel
thatthis is thefairestandmore opportunecompensationunderthe circumstances.
The Courdecassationis inclined to assert that, in default of voluntary performance
by the obligor, damages is the normal remedy, while specific performance under
Articles 1143 and 1144 of the Code Napoleon is somewhat abnormal and courts
cannot be prevailed upon to grant it. In this approach, courts are justified in not
granting specific performance whenever the inconvenience of such forced execution
would exceed the advantage, as when the cost of performing in kind is
disproportionate to the actual damage caused, or when it is no longer in the
creditor's interest, or when it would have a negative effect upon the interest of third
parties.").
26. See Litvinoff, supranote 8, § 3.4.
27. See Litvinoff, supranote 8, § 3.2.
28. See La. Civ. Code art. 1995; see also Fogle v. Feazel, 201 La. 899, 10 So.
2d 695, 698 (La. 1942).
29. See, e.g., Billot v. British Petroleum Oil Co., 93-1118 (La. 1994); 645 So.
2d 604, 612; Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La.
1988).
30. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.4.
31. Id. art. 2315.7.
32. See Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp., 21 Cal. App. 3d 541, 98 Cal. Rptr.
588 (Cal. 1971) (awarding punitive damages where a builder fraudulently induced
a homeowner to construct a patio in violation of local zoning regulations); F.D.
Borkholder Co. v. Sandock, 413 N.E. 2d 567 (Ind. 1980) (awarding punitive
damages for breach of contract where the builder deliberately deviated from
building plans, resulting in latent defects and rendering the structure unsuitable for
its intended use.). But see, Kinesoft Development Corp. v. Softbank Holdings Inc.,
319 F. Supp. 2d 869 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Metroplex Corp. v. Thompson Industries,
Inc., 25 Fed. Appx. 802 (10th Cir. 2002); In re Eurospark Industries, Inc. 288 B.R.
177 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2003); Weber v. Domel, 48 S.W. 3d 435 (Tex. App. Waco
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punitive damages may be awarded for breach of contract is if the
contract calls for such a remedy.33
In sum, damages in Louisiana are not always equivalent to the
value of specific performance and are limited to the amount that
would restore the obligee to his original position. Because the
civilian tradition will not impose undue burden on the obligor when
awarding specific performance, the same should hold true for
awarding damages. Damages should not exceed the amount
necessary to compensate an obligee for his actual loss unless punitive
damages are warranted under statute or by contract provisions.
B. LouisianaLaw Governing DamagesPriorto Corbello v. Iowa
Production
1. Articles and Statutes
The articles governing conventional obligations in Louisiana are
found in Book 111, Chapter 8 of the Louisiana Civil Code and apply
to awards for both conventional and tortious obligations.34 Under
these articles, an obligor is liable for damages resulting from his
failure to perform an obligation.35 Furthermore, a contract has the
effect of law as between contracting parties, and if the obligor fails to
perform the contract, he violates that law.36 The obligor's failure to
perform an obligation gives the obligee the right to demand
performance from the obligor when possible.37 Nonetheless, in
certain cases an obligor, through his own fault, may render
performance impracticable or useless to the obligee.38 In such cases,
the injured party is entitled to damages measured by the loss sustained
and the profit of which he has been deprived.39
As stated previously, in Louisiana, specific performance, rather
than monetarZ damages, is the preferred remedy to compensate an
injured party. Article 1986 stipulates that "upon an obligor' s failure
to perform an obligation to deliver a thing, or not to do an act, or to
execute an instrument, the court shall grant specific performance plus
2001) for cases where punitive damages were found to be unrecoverable in contract.
33. See Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991) (holding
that under Louisiana law, punitive damages cannot be awarded for breach of
contract, even if a party acts in bad faith in breaching the agreement.).
34. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315 (cross-reference to the articles concerning
damages for conventional obligations (La. Civ. Code art. 1995-1999)).
35. See id. art. 1994.
36. Id. art. 1983.
37. Id. art. 1986.
38. Id. art. 1986.
39. Id. art. 1995.
40. Id. art. 1986.
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damages for delay if the obligee so demands."4 If, however, specific
performance is impracticable, the court may award damages to the
obligee.42 Upon failure to perform an obligation that has another
object, such as an obligation to do, the granting of specific
performance is at the court's discretion. 3 The comments emphasize
that article 1986 follows the principle that an obligor's personal
freedom should not be encroached upon.'
Interestingly, a theme of limiting excessive damages is found
throughout the Code and related statutory materials. Civil Code
article 2298 stipulates that "the amount of compensation due is
measured by the extent to which one has been enriched or the other
has been impoverished, whichever is less."45 Article 2304, which is
found under the title governing obligations arising without agreement,
states that a person who receives an immovable or corporeal movable
must restore the thing itself, if it exists.46 However, it also provides:
...if the thing has been destroyed, damaged, or cannot be
returned, a person who received the thing in good faith is
bound to restore its value if the loss was caused by his fault.
A person who received the thing in bad faith is bound to
restore its value even if the loss was not caused by his fault.4 7
The language used in the article 2304 clearly states that if the
thing has been
damaged, only its "value" need be restored to
48
the owner.
The comments to Civil Code article 2305, which concerns things
that have been alienated, explain that damages are either awarded
based on the actual value of the thing sold or the sale price of the
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. art. 1986; see also Litvinoff, supra note 8, at § 3.1. ("Oftentimes,
however, it is not possible to constrain an obligor to perform. That may be so as a
matter of fact, as when, through his conduct, an obligor has made his performance
impossible, or has rendered it worthless to the obligee.... When that is the case,
the obligee's interest can be satisfied only by means of his receiving an equivalent
for the performance that he expected.").
43. La. Civ. Code art. 1986.
44. Id. art. 1986 cmt. (c).
45. Id. art. 2298 (emphasis added); see also id. art. 2298 cmt. (b) ("A person
is enriched within the meaning of this article when his patrimonial assets increase
or his liabilities diminish. Correspondingly, a person is impoverished when his
patrimonial assets diminish or his liabilities increase. There must be a causal
connection, whether direct or indirect, between a person's enrichment and another
person's impoverishment.").
46. Id. art. 2304 ("When the thing not owned is an immovable or a corporeal
movable, the person who received it is bound to restore the thing itself, if it
exists.").
47. Id. art. 2304 (emphasis added).
48. Id. art. 2403.
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thing, depending on whether the person was in good or bad faith.49

If the thing was sold in bad faith and the value is higher than the price
of the thing sold, then the damages awarded should be commensurate
to the value of thing sold. 50 Each of these articles illustrates the
legislative intention to limit the damages to a certain degree:
enrichment, diminution in value, or fair market value. Only in certain
limited instances has the legislature indicated a willingness to award
damages exceeding market value. Forexample, if a person trespasses
on another's land and cuts down timber, a combination of criminal
acts, treble damages are awarded.5 Likewise, articles 137-141 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code limit the remedy for breach of a promise to
pay mineral royalties to an amount equal to double the royalty due.52
Even in these articles, which allow the courts to award damages
exceeding the market value of the land, a limitation on the damages
is still present. An analysis of Louisiana statutes demonstrates an
overwhelming preference for limiting the measure of damages to
principles of enrichment, diminution in value, and fair market value.
The interpretation and application of these statutory principles has
been the task of Louisiana courts.
2. PriorJurisprudence
Until recently, Louisiana jurisprudence has supported the notion
that damages compensate the obligee for losses sustained due to
breach ofcontract. In Fogle v. Feazel,5 3 the Louisiana Supreme Court
recognized the parallels existing between damages flowing from
tortious conduct and breaches of conventional obligations. The Court
in Fogle found that "the word damages is defined as meaning
pecuniary compensation, recompense or satisfaction for an injury
49. See, e.g., id. art. 2305 and comments.
50. Id. art. 2305 cmt. (d) (citing 7 Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert, Traite
Practique de Droit Civil Francais, Obligations, 33 (2d ed. 1954) ("If he sold the
thing, being in good faith, he must make restitution of the price of the sale only (Art.
1380). If he was in bad faith, he owes the actual value of the thing, if that value is
higher than the price of the sale. If he made a donation, being in good faith, he
owes nothing; if he was in bad faith, he owes the value of thing.").
51. La. R.S. 3:4278.1 (1992).
52. See generallyLa. R.S. 31:137-141 (1992) ("If the lessee pays the royalties
due in response to the required notice, the remedy of dissolution shall be
unavailable unless it be found that the original failure to pay was fraudulent. The
court may award as damages double the amount of royalties due, interest on that
sum from the date due, and a reasonable attorney' s fee, provided the original failure
to pay royalties was either fraudulent or willful and without reasonable grounds.
In all other cases, such as mere oversight or neglect, damages shall be limited to
interest on the royalties computed from the date due, and a reasonable attorney's fee
if such interest is not paid within thirty days of written demand therefor.").
53. Fogle v. Feazel, 201 La. 899, 10 So. 2d 695 (La. 1942).

280

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

sustained., 54 In dictum, the Court linked the violation of contract
rights and obligations, stating that an award of "damages" was
monetary compensation equivalent to the loss sustained by the injured
party in either situation.55
Louisiana has generally employed three methods to calculate the
amount of damages for damaged property: 1) the cost to restore, if
the thing can be adequately repaired; 2) the difference in the value of
the thing before and after the damage; and 3) the cost to replace the
thing, less reasonable depreciation, if the value before and after the
damage cannot be reasonably determined or if the cost of repairs
exceeds the value of the thing damaged. 6 The Louisiana Supreme
Court denied writ in Matherne v. Terrebonne,5" which held that if
land is rendered useless, the proper measure of damages is the lesser
of either the market value of the property and severance damages
minus any residual value, or the cost to restore the property to its
original condition.58 In Ewell v. Petro Processorsof Louisiana,Inc.,
a case specifically dealing with the restoration of land contaminated
by toxic industrial waste, the first circuit court of appeal held that the
owners were only entitled to the diminution in value of the land.59
The court found that the measurement of damages should be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 6° The court proposed that the
following factors should be examined: "[T]he extent of damage, the
use to which the property may be put; the extent of economic loss,
both as to value and income; and the cost of and practicability of
54. Id. at 910, 10 So. 2d at 698 (citing Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition).
55. See id. ("Damages as used in discussing liability for violation of contract
rights and obligationsis but another word for compensation, an equivalent in money
for loss sustained by the complaining party by reason of violation of such right or
obligation.") (emphasis added).

56. Carter v. Gulf States Utilities Company, 454 So. 2d 817 (1984) (The First
Circuit Court of Appeal remanded the trial court's decision awarding the cost of
restoration to determine the value of the house before and after the accident); see

also Peak v. Cantey, 302 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Roshong v. Travelers
Insurance Company, 281 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1973); Aetna Insurance
Company v. Palao, 263 So. 2d 394 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Granger v. Boullion,
220 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Taylor v. Allstate Insurance Company,
205 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Keating v. Boyce Machinery Corp., 196
So. 2d 623 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); see also Maraist & Galligan, supra note 15,

§ 7-2(f). But see Fite v. Miller, 290 So. 2d 285 (La. 1940) (when the defendants
breached a contract to drill an oil well, the Court awarded the plaintiffs the cost to
drill the well-the actual cost of performance.).
57. Matheme v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 462 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1984), writ denied,463 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1985).
58. Id. at 279.
59. 364 So. 2d 604, 609 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), writ denied,366 So. 2d 575
(La. 1979).

60.

Id.
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restoration."'" Following the theory that tort damages and contract
damages essentially serve the same purpose, the most consistent
approach would be to follow a method such as Ewell and allow the
landowner to recover damages, thereby placing him a position similar
to the position he would have been in if the tort had not occurred or
the contract had not been breached.
The courts in Louisiana have dealt with the measurement of
damages not only in tort cases, but also in breach of contract cases.
In cases arising under a breach of contract theory, the courts have also
demonstrated a preference for limiting damages to the fair market
value of the thing damaged. Nippert v. Baton Rouge Railcar
Services, Inc.62 involved a defendant who breached a contract to
repair several of the plaintiff's passenger railcars. The plaintiff filed
suit alleging failure to properly restore the cars and failure to protect
the cars from exposure to weather conditions. The court reduced the
trial court's decision, which awarded $795,647 to the plaintiffs. The
first circuit court of appeal opined that if the cost to restore the thing
exceeds the value of the thing damaged, "then damages will be the
cost of replacing the items less reasonable depreciation. 63 The court
also reasoned that damages should operate to place the obligee in the
position he would have occupied if had the breach not occurred, "not
in a betterposition."' The result that the first circuit reached in this
case supports the purpose of damages by limiting them to the value
of the thing-not only for claims involving tort, but also those
involving breach of contract. Such a principle also ensures that the
obligee is not unjustly enriched and is not entitled to a windfall. Such
a principle ensures that the purpose of damages is served.
Roman Catholic Church v. Louisiana Gas Service Company65
recently affected the measurement of damages under Louisiana tort
law and supports the principle of examining the economic effects of
damage awards. The Roman Catholic Church sued a gas company
for damage caused by a fire due to the company's negligence. The
sole issue before the Louisiana Supreme Court was whether the lower
courts erred by limiting the damages to replacement cost less
depreciation, rather than full restoration damages for cost to repair the
property. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) acquired an apartment complex in Marrero, Louisiana for
$3,300,000 in December of 1976. In 1977, the Roman Catholic
Church of the Archdiocese of Louisiana contracted with HUD to
61. Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1978), writdenied, 366 So. 2d 575 (La. 1979).
62. 526 So. 2d 824 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied 530 So. 2d 84 (La. 1988).
63. Id. at 827.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. 618 So. 2d 874 (1993).
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manage the apartment complex, and from 1977 to 1980 the complex
underwent substantial renovations costing approximately $3 million.6 6
The complex provided federally subsidized housing for 200 lowincome families. The Church managed the complex for five years
and then consented to purchase it without a public bid for $1.7
million. 67 The contract was made under the condition that the Church
would continue to provide housing to low-income families for fifteen
years; otherwise, the property reverted to HUD.6 8 In 1983, just over
two years after the Church's purchase, the natural gas regulating
equipment malfunctioned resulting in a fire. The fire only affected
one of the thirteen building units.
The Louisiana Supreme Court looked to several sources regarding
the allowable recovery for the plaintiffs, including the Louisiana
Constitution, common law authority on damages, and Louisiana case
law. The Court cited article I, § 4 of the Louisiana Constitution,
which states that an owner should be compensated "to the full extent
of his loss and place the owner in as good a position pecuniarily as
[he] enjoyed prior to the taking. ' 69 The Court stated that when a
plaintiffs property is damaged unlawfully by a tortfeasor, "[h]e
should be compensated at least as fully as when his property is
damaged by the state for a public purpose Pursuant to the owner's
obligation of citizenship to the community." Ultimately, the Court
relied on a comment from the Restatement Second of Torts, the Civil
Code, and state property damage principles (all of which foster the
same goal) and found that courts should ordinarily award the cost of
restoration. 7 ' The Court further explained that when the cost to
restore the land to its original state is disproportionate to the
diminution in value, the courts should use diminution in value unless
the owner has a personal reason for restoring the property to its
original condition.72 The Court concluded that when a person's
property sustains damage due to the fault of another, he may recover
either the cost to restore or the difference in value between the
property before and after the damage occurred. However, the Court
qualified the choice, holding that only diminution in value should be
awarded to the landowner if the cost of restoring the property to its
original position is "disproportionate to the value of the property or
66. Id. at 875.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 876 (quoting State v. Bitterwolf, 415 So. 2d 196, 199 (La. 1982).
70. Id.
71. Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 929, cmt. b ("Even in the absence of value
arising from personal use, the reasonable cost of replacing the land in its original
position is ordinarily allowable as the measure of recovery.").
72. Roman Catholic Church, 618 So. 2d at 878.
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economicallywasteful. ,7 3 The Court stipulated two exceptions to this

rule: 1) if there was a reason personal to the owner for restoring the
property, or 2) if the there existed sufficient reason to believe that the
plaintiff would in fact restore the property.74
Under the facts of the case, the Court found that the plaintiffs in
Church were entitled to recover the full amount of restoration
damages. The Roman Catholic Church's mission to house
underprivileged families was its personal reason for restoring the
property to its original condition.7 The Court further opined that the
cost of restoration would neither be disproportionate to the value of
the property, nor economically wasteful, since the original cost of the
building, coupled with the renovations, exceeded the cost to restore
the building.
The Court essentially imposed a reasonableness
standard, which applies even where the exceptions exist.
In Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Pan American Petroleum
77 the third circuit court of appeal considered the
Corporation,
economic efficiency of restoring the leased property. The court held
that the landowner was entitled to monetary damages for damage to
the leased land, but that the oil and gas lessee was not required to pay
for the cost of completely restoring the property surrounding six
abandoned wells to its original condition. The court observed that a
total restoration of the land would entail filling of all the ruts, slush
pits, mud pits, and trenches, regardless of whether it was
economically prudent. The court could find no reason why such
measures should take place because it could not "believe that the
parties intended such reparation to be done when the contract was
entered into."78
Another recent case that mirrors the issues in Corbello is
MagnoliaCoal Terminalv. PhillipsOil Co.,79 in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court recognized that a mineral lessee's duty to restore the
leased premises was limited by a standard of reasonableness. The
Court applied Mineral Code article 12280 to hold that "[t]he implied
obligation of the mineral lessee to restore the surface is limited by a

73. Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 880
76. Id. (The complex was acquired by the HUD for $3.3 million, renovated for
$3 million and sold to the Archdiocese for $1.7 million. The Court found that since
the value of the apartment complex far exceeded the cost to restore it the award was
not economically wasteful.).
77. 177 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
78. Id. at 158.
79. 576 So. 2d 475 (La. 1991).
80. La. R.S. 31:122 (2003).
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standard of reasonableness. 81 While the lease in Magnolia Coal
involved an implied obligation to restore the land, that duty was
limited by reasonableness-just as the contractual language in
Corbello.12 Since all mineral leases are subject to an implied
condition to restore, the Corbello Court's decision will have
relevance to the thousands of mineral leases in Louisiana and will
result in massive restoration costs, regardless of the property's market
value.
The courts in Louisiana have clearly been concerned with limiting
damages based on economic factors for obligations arising without
agreement (torts) and also for conventional obligations. Like the
legislature, courts have concluded that damages should restore the
obligee to his original condition, which can be done by awarding the
fair market value of the thing. While Louisiana typically prefers the
civil law method of specific performance, it will refuse to award the
83
remedy if it would result in an undue burden on the plaintiff.
Likewise, the monetary damages should not impose an undue burden
on the obligor and outweigh the benefits received by the obligee.
C. Common Law Methods: Cost to Restore, Diminutionin Value,
and the DisproportionateTest
1. Restatement of Contracts: The ClearlyDisproportionate
Rule
The common law theory of damages has traditionally found that
an award of damages for destruction or contamination to property
should not be disproportionate to the diminution in value. This
principle is seen in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
states that if the owner fails to show an individualized loss in value
with sufficient certainty, the owner may instead recover the
reasonable cost of completed performance, but only if that cost is "not
clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value." This means
that when restoration costs clearly exceed the loss in value, the owner
should receive the diminution in market value. The comment to
section 348 explicitly rejects the First Restatement's use of the term
"economic waste" as misleading because an owner who receives
81. Magnolia Coal Terminal, 576 So. 2d at 483.
82. Corbello v. Iowa Production, 2002 -0826 (La. 2003), 850 So. 2d 686,695.
83. Litvinoff, supra note 24, § 171 ("Indeed, either on common-law grounds
such as the need of protracted supervision, or civil law grounds such as
impossibility or impracticability of performance in specific for, the fact is that both
systems refuse specific performance whenever the inconvenience of enforcing it is
out of proportion to the damage sustained by the obligee.").
84. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 348(2).
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more in damages than the actual "loss in value" ordinarily will not
use the money to perform the repairs." Nonetheless, the courts
continue to principally inquire whether the cost of completion would
constitute an inefficient use of resources resulting in economic
waste.86
2. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent: The Development of the Clearly
DisproportionateRule
Justice Benjamin Cardozo paved the path for the measurement of
damages in Jacobs& Youngs v. Kent.87 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. agreed
to construct a residence for the defendant. The agreement stipulated
that all pipes for the plumbing should be a "standard pipe of Reading
Manufacture."88 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. completed the house, but
installed pipe made from factories other than Reading. The defendant
demanded that the plumbing be reinstalled to specifications; however,
to do so would entail demolition at a large expense. Justice Cardozo
stated, "We must weigh the purpose to be served, the desire to be
gratified, the excuse for deviation from the letter, the cruelty of
enforced adherence. Then only can we tell whether literal fulfillment
is to be implied by law as a condition."89 The court looked to the
motive behind the party's breach, determining whether the failure to
perform was intentional or unintentional. It also aimed to determine
whether the condition breached was at the heart of the contract. The
court's final conclusion ordered the diminution in value rather than
the cost to complete, holding that the owner is entitled to restoration
damages unless the cost to restore is disproportionate to the benefit
achieved. The case is the quintessential example of a court's refusal
to commit economic waste, even where the injured party expressly
contracted for a particular duty. Nonetheless, the court did not fail to
address other concerns and issues involved in the breach of contract,
creating a flexible test that took social policies into consideration. 9°
85. Carol Chomsky, Of Spoil Pits and Swimming Pools: Reconsidering the
Measure ofDamagesfor ConstructionContracts,75 Minn. L. Rev. 1445, 1452-53

(1991).
86. Id. at 1460.
87. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The court looked at the reasons the party breached the contract and what
benefit the breaching party received. It also inquired into the principle reasons the
party entered the contract. In Jacobs and Young, Inc. the homeowner desired a
specific type of pipe in his house to suit his personal preferences. However, since
the pipe used was substantially the same, the court found the breach to be not as
reprehensible as if the builder would have selected a lower grade pipe, and therefore
making a higher profit. Had that been the case, the court may have found the
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3. The Ongoing Struggle between Groves andPeevyhouse
The common law has struggled for years with the tension created
by two seminal cases concerning remedies for breach of contract:
Grovesv. John Wunder Company and Peevyhouse v. GarlandCoal
andMining Company.92 Subsequent case law and commentaries have
praised and criticized both Groves and Peevyhousefor their diametric
decisions. The two cases demonstrate the alternative damages
awarded for expectation interest: cost to restore versus diminution in
value.93

In Groves v. John Wunder, Company, the plaintiff agreed to lease
its land to the defendant for seven years. 94 The defendant agreed to

remove sand and gravel from the property and leave the property "at
a uniform grade, substantially the same as the grade now existing at
the roadway.

. .

and on said premises." 95 John Wunder Company

deliberately breached the contract, removing only "the richest and
best gravel" from the property and leaving the property "broken,
rugged and uneven. 96 Groves sued John Wunder Company for the
damage to his land and failure to fulfill the terms of the contract. The
lower court found that 288,495 cubic yards of material would have to
be excavated and deposited elsewhere to return the land to the proper
grade, costing $60,000. 97 The restoration process would increase the

reasonable value of the property to only $12,160 (approximatelyfive
times less than the cost to restore). 98 The trial court awarded the
plaintiffs approximately $15,000-the difference between the market
builder's acts to be malicious and awarded more damages. Compare to Corbello,
in which the landowners entered the contract to make a profit. It is hard to believe
that the obligation to restore the property was at the heart of the
contract-especially when since such a provision is a standard clauses in mineral
leases. Mineral leases are entered with the hope that minerals will be found and
produced, resulting in royalties to the lessee and lessor, alike. That is the objective
at the heart of the contract.
91. Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939).
92. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining, Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962);
see also, Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. GarlandCoal & Mining Co. Revisited:
The Balladof Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1341 (1995) (for an extensive
comment of Peevyhouse).
93. See Johnson v. Bovee, 574 P.2d 513 (Colo. App. 1978), for a discussion
that contract price should be a ceiling. But see Southern Painting Co. v. United
States, 222 F.2d 431(10th Cir. 1955), for a discussion that contract price should not
be a ceiling.
94. Groves, 286 N.W. 235.
95. Id. at 238.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 236.
98. Id. Compare to Corbelloin which restoration damages were approximately
300 times the market value of the property.
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value of the land when the contract was made and the condition of the
land if John Wunder Company would have fulfilled the contract. The
plaintiffs appealed the decision, and the appellate court held that if a
party willfully fails to perform under a contract, the other party will
be entitled to damages equal to the reasonable cost of having the
performance carried out and not the difference in value resulting from
the failure to perform.99 The court steadfastly maintained that in a
deliberate and willful breach of contract, the value of the land should
have nothing to do with damages awarded. The court found that the
plaintiff would not be unjustly or unconscionably enriched by forcing
the defendant, John Wunder Company, to provide what it had already
promised and received payment for."
Peevyhouse v. GarlandCoal Mining presents the polar opposite
conclusion to the decision found in Groves v. John Wunder.'0 1 The
Peevyhouses leased their land to the Garland Coal Mining Company
for strip mining, with the condition that Garland would perform
specific restorative and remedial work on the land once the lease
ended. Garland refused to perform the restoration, which would have
cost approximately $29,000 and increased the value of the property
by only $300.112 The Oklahoma Supreme Court explained that
ordinarily the measure of damages in breach of contract is the
reasonable cost of performance of the work.1 1 3 However, if the
economic benefit gained by a lessor from the full performance is
grossly disproportionate to the cost to complete, the lessor's recovery
is limited to diminution in value to the property caused by the nonperformance. °4 Unlike the duty to restore terminology used in
Corbello,the duty to restore the land in Groves did, in fact, appear to
be a term that the plaintiff's actually bargained for. 5 Furthermore,
while Peevyhouse completely contradicted the decision in Groves,
common law jurisdictions typically award either the diminution in
value or the cost to restore, whichever is less.

99. Id. at 238.
100. Id. (In a dissenting opinion by Justice Julius Olson, to which Justice Holt
concurred, it was urged that the diminished value rule be applied when there was
insufficient evidence showing that the completed product was to satisfy the personal
taste of the promisee and denied that the willfulness of breach should affect the
measure of damages.)
101. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining, Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962);
Groves, 286 N.W. 235.
102. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 112.
103. Id. at 110.
104. Id.
105. Id.at 111.
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4. Subsequent Case Law in Common Law Jurisdictions
The trend in most states has been to limit the damages awarded
for destruction to property, based on the diminution in value,
depreciation, or fair market value of the land. Indiana courts have
refused to award repairs that would result in damages exceeding the
economic benefit that such repairs confer. An Indiana appellate court
rejected a measurement of damages based on cost to repair for
$22,700 where a measurement for $1,942.50 based on the "loss in
value" to the land was available, even though the larger award would
have placed the plaintiffs in a position closer to the position that they
would have been in had the contract been fulfilled." In a later case
involving a breach of contract to complete the filling of land, costing
approximately $600,000 and making the value of the land
approximately $180,000, the court of appeals in City of Anderson,
Indiana,v. Salling ConcreteCorporationstated that "rather than have
the benefit of some $180,000 in cash, [defendant] would have the
benefit of $180,000 in land value by making the City of Anderson
literally bury nearly $600,000 in cash in Salling's land. That would
be economic waste."' 7 The court ultimately concluded that the trial
court did not err in08awarding diminution in value of the fair market
value of the land. 1
In Missouri, the law is much the same and refuses to allow the
cost for restoration where it results in either excessive damages or a
value greater than the depreciation in value."° The courts limit the
award to the deprecation in the market value of the land unless the
cost to repair would be less than the deprecation in value.' 10 In New
Hampshire, a court recognized that sometimes it is economically
wasteful to place the party in the same position that they would have
enjoyed had the contract been fully performed.'
Oklahoma law specifically addresses damages for land and
groundwater which has been contaminated by oilfield operations by
statute. 12 Property owners may recover either the cost to restore or
the diminution in value for property, whichever is less." 3 The courts
106. Irving v. Ort,128 Ind.App. 225, 146 N.E.2d 107 (Ind.App. 1958).
107. City of Anderson, Indiana v. Sailing Concrete Corporation, 411 N.E.2d
728, 734 (Ind.App. 1980).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g.,Dimick v. Noonan, 242 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1951); Robinson v.
Moark Consolidating Mining Co., 163 S.W. 885 (Mo. App. 1914); Thompson v.
Granite Bitumibous Paving Co, 203 S.W. 496,498 (Mo. App. 1918).
110. See, e.g.,Dimick, 242 S.W.2d 599; Robinson, 163 S.W. 885; Thompson,
203 S.W. at 498.
111. Emery v. Caldonia Sand & Gravel Co., 347 A. 2d 929, 933 (N.H. 1977).
112. Okla.Stat. tit. 52, § 318 (Supp. 1982).
113. See, e.g., Schneberger v. Apache Corp. 890 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1994).
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will defer to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, the responsible
regulatory agency, for damaged groundwater in Oklahoma if the
property owner requests restoration damages, "but in no event will the
surface estate owner collect damages in excess of the fair market
value of the land.' 4 Texas courts, following the common law
tradition, also cap damages at the fair market value of the land." 5
Finally, the Supreme Court ofMississippi recently reversed a $2.3
million restoration damages award for the clean-up of an oilfield
because the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies
before seeking relief in the courts. 6 The conclusion reached in
Mississippi has several benefits. For instance, since landowners are
forced to seek relief with an administrative agency, it is more likely
that the contaminated land will actually be restored. The result in
Mississippi is a more efficient and effective way of ensuring that
property in the state is unpolluted, as opposed to the result in
Louisiana where the CorbelloCourt gave $33 million to a landowner
with the hope that the plaintiffs will use it to restore the land." 7
Given the choice, it is likely that most landowners would decide to
invest the $33 million elsewhere and purchase a similar piece of
property that is uncontaminated. The state agencies, on the other
hand, have an interest in protecting the public and the property of the
state. 118 Therefore, by directing the landowners to state or federal
agencies, a satisfactory conclusion is reached for all parties
involved-the landowners are restored their property, the lessees pay
restoration costs as determined by environmental specialists, the
state's property is clean, and the public is protected.
11.CORBELLO V. IOWA PRODUCTION: THE THIRTY-THREE MILLION

DOLLAR DECISION

Corbellov. Iowa Production19 is one of the most recent cases in
Louisiana dealing with restoration damages. While bearing factual
resemblances to many prior cases involving damaged property and,
114. See Gary Linn Evans, Texas Landowners Strike Water-Surface Estate
Remediation andLegislativelyenhancedLiability in the OilPatch-A ProposalFor
Optimum ProtectionofGroundwaterResourcesfromOil andGas Explorationand
Productionin Texas, 37 S.Tex. L. Rev. 477, 478 (1996).
115. See, e.g., B.A. Mortgage Co., Inc. and Metro Development, Inc., v.

Lawrence E. McCullough, 590 S.W. 2d 955 (Tx. App. 1979).
116. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Smith, 844 So. 2d 1145 (Miss. 2002).
117. 2002-0826 (La. 2003), 850 So. 2d 686.
118. See Simoneaux v. Amoco Prod. Co., 2002-1050 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003)
(upholding the Corbello decision and finding that a private landowners have no
duty to seek relief from an administrative agency prior to filing suit against an oil
company).
119. 2002-0826 (La. 2003), 850 So. 2d 686.

290

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

specifically, Roman CatholicChurch,120 the Louisiana Supreme Court
distinguished damages for tortious acts and breaches of contract. The
Court held that contracts should be held to the four comers doctrine
and that the cost to restore, rather than diminution in value, should be
the appropriate measurement for damage to property in breach of
contract cases.
A. FactualBackground
In 1929, the plaintiffs in Corbello entered into a mineral lease
with the defendant, Shell Oil Company. The lease covered 320 acres
in Calcasieu Parish, known as Iowa Field. In 1961, Shell entered into
a surface lease with the plaintiffs for 120 acres, which was included
in the original mineral lease. Shell operated the lease until 1985, at
which point Shell transferred the interest to Rosewood Resources,
Incorporated. Subsequently, Shell built an oil terminal on the leased
land and operated the terminal until 1993. The 1929 lease authorized
Shell to dispose of saltwater produced on the plaintiff's land and had
no clause obligating Shell to restore the land.
The lease generated
122
over $19 million in royalties, an eighth payable to the plaintiffs.
The 1961 surface lease stipulated that Shell would "reasonably restore
the premises as nearly as possible to their present condition."123 The
1961 surface lease expired on May 10,1991, and on May 9, 1991, the
plaintiffs sent Shell a letter notifying Shell that it had breached the
lease by disposing of saltwater on the property and failing to abide by
the terms of the lease.
During the lease, Shell disposed of 501.6 million barrels of
saltwater on the plaintiff's property. Approximately 332 million
barrels of the total amount disposed of were produced from the
plaintiff's property, in accordance with the mineral lease. 124 Of the
remaining 169.6 million barrels, only 1.6 million barrels were not
produced from Shell's leases on Iowa Field. These barrels were
admittedly disposed of by the defendant due to the negligence of
Shell employees. 25 The disposal of 500 million of the barrels, or
120. 618 So. 2d 874 (La. 1993).
121. See Leger v. Petroleum Engineers, Inc., 499 So. 2d 953, 955-56 (La. App.
3rd Cir. 1986) ( holding that the right to dispose of saltwater is impliedly granted
in a mineral lease).
122. Shell Oil Company's Original Brief on the Merits, Corbello, 850 So. 2d
686.
123. Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 694.
124. Shell's Writ Application, Corbello, 850 So. 2d 686.
125. Petitioner's Original Brief on the Merits, Corbello,850 So. 2d 686. Note
the similarity to Jacob & Youngs v. Kent. Cardozo explicitly stated that the
defendant's omission of the correct pipe was the result of "oversight and inattention

20041

COMMENTS

99.96% of1the
26 saltwater disposed of on the plaintiff's property, was
authorized.
The plaintiffs and Shell attempted to resolve the issue for about
sixteen or seventeen months, at which point the plaintiffs filed suit
against Shell. The plaintiffs sought damages for unauthorized
disposal of saltwater, trespass of property after expiration of the lease,
and failure to maintain the property in the condition provided for in
the lease.
B. The Majority Opinion
Ultimately, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court
decision awarding $33 million in restoration damages for the property
which was valued at $108,000 in its decontaminated state. 127 The
Court distinguished the facts of Corbello from Roman Catholic
Church, noting that the two parties entered into a contract which
expressly stipulated that the land should be reasonably restored to its
original condition.128 The Court concluded that the agreement should
be strictly held to the four comers doctrine and ordered damages for
cost to restore.129 The award created a windfall to the plaintiff in the
sense that the damages rose to 300 times the market value of the
property. Of the $33 million awarded for restoration of the land, the
Court awarded $28 million for a public harm due to the threat of
contamination to an aquifer.130 The Court acknowledged that the
plaintiffs may never decontaminate the aquifer, leaving the public
The Court felt, however, that the state's
harm unaltered.'
"understaffed" and "underfunded" regulatory agencies might also fail
32
to repair the potential damage caused to the aquifer.
C. The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Victory recognized that, "The jury was
clearly wrong in determining that $33 million was a 'reasonable'
amount of money to restore a piece of property worth $108,000."'' 1
The majority, on the other hand, failed to adequately address what the
of the plaintiff s subcontractor." Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y.
1921).
126. Original Brief on the Merits on Behalf of Shell at 3, Corbello, 850 So. 2d
686.
127. Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 692-93.
128. Id. at 695.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 699.
131. Id. at 701.
132. Id. at711.
133. Id. (Victory, J., dissenting).
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word "reasonably" meant in the contract, leaving a significant gap in
its analysis. Justice Victory also opined that the landowners should
be forced to use the $28 million awarded for the contamination of the
aquifer should be used for remediation since it was a public drinking
water supply.134
I1.ANALYSIS

A. Interpretingthe ContractualTerm "ReasonablyRestore"
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "A word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it was used."' 35 The Corbello
decision certainly brings new meaning to the word "reasonably."
While reasonably is typically defined as "moderate,"' 13 6 the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that $33 million was reasonable for restoring
land damaged by salt water, which is worth only $108,000 in its
decontaminatedstate. 137 Louisiana Civil Code article 2046 states that
"[w]hen the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no
absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search
of the parties' intent."1'3 8 The interpretation of the words "reasonably
restored" was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court to mean
complete restoration-no matter what the cost. The oil and gas
industry argues that this conclusion leads to immoderate and absurd
consequences.
The Court's analysis provides little explanation for its conclusion
that $33 million was reasonable for a breach of contract. In the
opinion, Justice Johnson stated that,
We find that the contractual terms of a contract, which
convey the intentions of the parties, overrule any policy
considerations behind such a rule limiting damages in tort
cases . . .The measure of damages in breach of contract

cases is governed by the four corners of the contract. In this
case, Shell, a sophisticated company with vast experience in
negotiating oil and gas contracts, bound itself by contract to
'reasonably restore plaintiff's property as near as possible to
its original condition.' Shell must not be allowed to now
alter the terms of this contract by limiting its liability to an
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. (Victory, J., dissenting).
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S. Ct. 158, 159 (1918).
Black's Dictionary 712 (7th ed. 1999).
Corbello,850 So. 2d at 692.
La. Civ. Code art. 2046.
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amount reasonably or rationally limited to the market value
of the property."139

The Court seems to interpret the contract term to reasonably restore
the land as a stipulated damages clause. In fact, the term is simply
another contractual duty agreed upon by the parties. Failure to fulfill
that term is a breach of an obligation, not a stipulated damages clause
if that obligation is not fulfilled. If such was the case, the term would
be worded to the effect of "if this contract is breached, then lessors
shall recover the full restoration cost of the land." But the contract
was not stated in such a fashion.
In measuring the damages equal to the cost of restoration, the
Court, in effect, awarded the value of specific performance with
inadequate consideration of the economic or social factors
involved. 4 ° Damages do not always equal the value of specific
performance. Damages make the plaintiff whole. To accomplish that
goal does not mean that the plaintiff must receive the cost of specific
performance. Furthermore, the word "reasonably" in the contract
certainly provides a limitation on the contract term. la ' While the
Court accused Shell of attempting to "alter" the contract in its favor,
the Court itself alters the contract by reading the word "reasonably"
out of the contract.'42 The Court acknowledged that the word existed
and that it was a term that Shell relied on,' 43 but failed to address the
meaning or purpose of the word as used in the contract. The dissent,
however, did find the word "reasonably" to be an important word in
the contract and criticized the majority opinion for its failure to
recognize its importance."
B. ContrastingPolicies:Avoiding Windfalls vs. DeterringIndustry
Malfeasance
As noted previously, the Corbello case presented a difficult
situation for the Louisiana Supreme Court. If the Court limited
damages to the fair market value of the land or diminution in value,
it would have been criticized for allowing oil and gas companies to
contaminate land. The companies could easily calculate their loss
139. Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 695.
140. See Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253, 258 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1958) (which indicates an economic balancing process to limit the duty to
restore. The court refused to award damages for failure to restore land to complete
fertility, noting that the use of land was reasonable and the loss of fertility was not
due to negligence, cited in La. R.S. 31:122, cmt.).
141. Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 695.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 692.
144. Id. at 711 (Victory, J., dissenting).
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before entering the contract by determining the fair market value of
the land, as well as the profit that could be derived from the oil
extracted; thereafter, the companies could calculate whether the
transaction would be a profitable one before entering into the mineral
lease. Thus, many would argue that such a conclusion encourages
breach of contract, so long as that breach of is efficient. However, by
not limiting the measure of damages, the Court granted the
landowners a tremendous windfall. Furthermore, the conclusion led
to the possibility that the land and aquifer would not be remediated.
The purpose of remedies is to restore the injured party to the
position that they were in before the harmful event occurred, whether
it be in tort or breach of contract. Assume a creditor lends a debtor
one thousand dollars. When repayment on the loan becomes due, the
debtor pays X one thousand dollars rather than the creditor. The
debtor still owes the creditor one thousand dollars, and the creditor is
still deficient one thousand dollars. This is the same situation created
by the Court in Corbello-thecreditor being the public, the debtor
being Shell, and X being the plaintiffs. Even though Shell no longer
has its "one thousand dollars," the public is not compensated for its
loss. In this case, it might even be argued that the public's injury is
greater than the plaintiffs, since the public health is put in
danger-not simply a financial injury. Therefore, when the Court
awarded $28 million in damages to the plaintiffs in Corbellofor the
potential contamination of the public aquifer, they failed to
adequately consider: 1) whether an injury existed, and 2) who was
injured, and 3) whether the injured party could be restored. 45
Obviously, the public is not protected or remedied by the Court's
decision since only one small group of individuals received damages
to compensate for the possible injury to many. There is no indication
that the plaintiffs would decontaminate the public aquifer, nor are
they required to do so; there is no duty for them to perform
remediation. 14 6 It seems that the legislature and the proper regulatory
body are the appropriate entities to conserve and enhance
145. In Louisiana, groundwater is a "water of the state," and a landowner does
not own the water below his property. See Adams v.Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 62224 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963). Therefore, contamination of drinking water is a public
harm, not a private harm.
146. See Litvinoff, supra note 8, § 3.4 ( "[The obligee] is free, however, to do
just as he pleases with the money awarded to him in damages. He is not bound to
use that money for any repairs to things that have been damaged, or to restore any
situation to its original state, or to buy a new thing to replace the one lost because
of the obligor's fault."); see alsoEverett v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 218 La. 835, 51
So. 2d 879 (1951); Savoy v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. La. 1963).
After the Corbellodecision the Louisiana legislature enacted a statute requiring the
property owner to restore the land with the awarded damages, but only for certain
types of groundwater. See La. R.S. 3:4278.1 (1992).
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environmental resources, not a landowner who owes no obligation to
the public.
At first glance, the most efficient method of remedying the
plaintiff for damaged property is to look for substitutes in the market.
For example, assume property equivalent in value to property
contaminated in a breach of contract is available for a purchase price
lower than the cost to restore the damaged land. The court could
order the obligor to pay the obligee the purchase price of the
uncontaminated land. In such a case, the obligee is returned to a
position similar to the position he would have enjoyed if the
obligation had actually been performed. In the case of Corbello,the
Court could have ordered Shell to pay $108,000 rather than $33
million, leaving the economy an extra $32,892,200. While Shell does
not in and of itself represent the economy in its totality, Shell's
position as an economic entity allows it to affect other parts of the
economy by redistributing $32,892,200 more efficiently and
effectively than the plaintiffs in Corbello. For example, Shell creates
thousands of employment opportunities, an extremely important
factor in the economy and social well-being of the state and country.
Furthermore, the oil and gas that Shell produces provides fuel for
automobiles, heaters, steam boilers, trains, and jet planes. In turn,
each of these uses helps to create more employment opportunities in
other industries.14 7 Furthermore, the result of Corbello not only
affects Shell and its decisions to take risks in Louisiana, but it also
affects the decisions of every other oil and gas company doing
business in the state. Therefore, when one applies the economic
benefits that Shell provides, those benefits must be multiplied by the
benefits created by Exxon-Mobile, Chevron, Texaco and every other
oil and gas company doing business in Louisiana, for they too are
now faced with the extra risk factor created in Corbello.
Even though this economic analysis is beneficial, it is not without
problems. First, while awarding the plaintiff the market value of
substitutes appears to be an economically efficient conclusion, in
some instances, the plaintiff may not be fully compensated for the
loss sustained, as set forth in Roman CatholicChurch.'48 Oftentimes,
people have personal attachments to land. In such a case, the plaintiff
147. For example, the fuel provided by oil and gas companies fuels jet planes,
which provides employment opportunities for pilots, flight attendants, air traffic
controllers. Airlines, in turn create a more mobile society allowing for more
frequent travel and hence creating a larger tourism and travel industry. With an
increase in travel, there is a greater need for hotels, restaurants, and tourist
attractions, thereby creating a demand for more goods and services which results
in the creation of more jobs. These examples are virtually endless.
148. Roman Catholic Church v. Louisiana Gas Service Company, 618 So. 2d
874 (La. 1993).
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suffers not only a pecuniary loss, but also a non-pecuniary loss. No
piece of property, no matter how close in pecuniary value, may return
the plaintiff to the position that he occupied before the breach.
Secondly, economics does not rely only on currency and present
day figures. The economy also suffers when it loses valuable
resources. The future value of the land, as well as environmental
damage, contribute to the status of the economy. So, while the
economy gains $32,892,200, it also loses certain uses of the
property-valuable uses which could have been exploited and utilized
for years to come.'4 9

For example, the land may not be able to

produce certain vegetation in certain areas, limiting its agricultural
value. However, one must also keep in mind other uses for the
property, which are not affected by the saltwater contamination, such
as the development of real estate.
The decision could likely result in a stifled oil and gas industry.
The oil and gas industry is a major segment of Louisiana's
economy 5 0 and losing it would be devastating to the state's economy.
The Corbello decision may cause many oil and gas companies, as
well as potential lessees, to have reservations about conducting
business in Louisiana, fearing payment of exorbitant damages for
contamination and even possible contamination. These damages
could include contamination caused by a previous lessee or merely
contamination that is unrealized. The current economic status of
Louisiana depends on the oil and gas industry. The industry provides
jobs and wealth to the state.15 The fact that Corbello could affect
companies' decisions to engage in contracts and do business in
Louisiana threatens the status and security that Louisiana now holds
in the oil and gas industry and its economy in general.
149. It should be noted that there is no indication that these values were lost in
regard to the property in Corbello.
150. See Loren C. Scott, The Energy Sector: A Giant Economic Engine For the
Louisiana Economy 1-2 (Study for Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas
Association, 1996) ("Louisiana is the nation's number three producer of oil,
producing over 1.1 million barrels a day in 1995. The U.S. is even more reliant on
Louisiana as a source of natural gas... over one-fourth of the nation's natural gas
comes from Louisiana ... Louisiana ranks number two among the 50 states in
petroleum refining capacity.")
151. See Loren, supra note 149, at 5-7 ("In 1995, there were 60,602 covered
workers employed in the oil and gas extraction, refining, and pipeline industries.
...
Employment in oil and gas extraction is by far the largest component of the
energy workforce with 44,144 covered workers or about three-fourths of the total
....
What is more remarkable is the impact of these three industries on the
incomes of Louisiana citizens ... these three industries [oil and gas extraction,
refining, and pipelines] generated over $2.7 billion in covered wages for Louisiana
in households in 1995. These three industries, through their direct effects alone,
generated 6.6 percent of the total covered wages earned in Louisiana in 1995.").
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Furthermore, the Corbellodecision will lead to landowners and
lessors, with pre-Corbelloleases, rushing to the courts to claim their
damages for harm that might be caused to their land, arguing that
their lessees have not "reasonably restored" the land.5 2 As stated
earlier in this comment, every mineral lease contains an implied duty
to restore the property to its original condition.' 53 Since this is true,
then any person or company who leased land from a landowner is left
wondering if their fate includes the payment of millions of dollars.
It will be interesting to see whether the courts interpret damages for
the implied duty to reasonably restore property as they have
54
interpreted damages for the explicit duty to "reasonably restore."'
152. See Germany v. Texaco, Inc., No. 101,175, Div. E, 16th Judicial District
Court, Iberia Parish; J. Pauline Duhe v. Texaco, Inc., No. 101,227, Div. E, 16th
District, Iberia Parish; see also Gravolet v. Fair Grounds Corp., 2003-0392,878 So.
2d 900, (La. App. 4th Cir. 2004) & Simoneaux v. Amoco Production Corp., 20021050 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003), 860 So. 2d 560 (both cases decided after Corbello
and involving damage to leased property.) Gravoletdid not involve contamination
of property. Nonetheless, the court upheld the rule from Corbello, The parties in
Gravolet stipulated in a lease for the use of a restaurant that the landlord could
require that the building be "replaced in its originalconditionupon the termination
or expiration of [the] lease." Gravolet, 878 So. 2d at 904. (emphasis added).
Upholding Corbello, the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to full
restoration costs and that the damages should not be limited to fair market value.
Id. In Simoneaux, a case closely resembling the facts of Corbello, the court upheld
Corbello in concluding that it was not required to defer primary jurisdiction to the
Louisiana Office of Conservation. Further, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $375,000
for cost to repair salt damage to one of seven well sites that the plaintiffs contended
was contaminated. The trial judge overturned the jury's verdict and found that
contamination existed at all seven sites. Due to this conclusion, the trial judge
adopted the plaintiffs' experts' remediation plan and awarded the plaintiff's over
$12 million in damages for property valued at $71,500. The court found that the
judge in the case erred and that the jury could have reasonably found that only one
site required remediation and could reasonably rely on the defendants' experts for
the cost of that remediation. Simoneaux, 860 So. 2d at 574.
153. See La. R.S. 31:122 (2000) ("A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary
obligation to his lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to
develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the
mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate what shall constitute
reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.").
154. Subsequent to the writing of this comment, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that, "in the absence of an express lease provision, Mineral Code article 122
does not impose an implied duty to restore the surface to its original, pre-lease
condition absent proof that the lessee has exercised his rights under the lease
unreasonable or excessively." See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy,
Inc., 2004-0968 (La. 2005), 2005 WL 106482. The decision was an important one
for oil and gas companies and mineral lessees in Louisiana. However, it raises the
concern that some mineral leases created prior to the Corbello case may have
expressly stated the Mineral Code article 122 implied duty in their
contracts-knowing that they would be bound by such a duty whether it was in the
contract or not. After Corbello, however, the lessee will be bound by the stricter
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C. CertaintyofDamages
The Corbellodecision also opens doors for plaintiffs concerning
the certainty of damages. Generally, two conditions must exist to
award damages for the failure to perform an obligation. First, the
obligee must actually sustain damage, and second, the
nonperformance of the obligation must be imputable to the
obligor.'55 An obligee has the burden of proving that the injuries
caused by the obligor's fault are certain and not merely
theoretical.'56 A mere possibility that damages might result from
the obligor's fault is not sufficient to recover damages. 1 In order
to recover damages a plaintiff must prove that the loss he sustained
was due to the obligor's failure to perform a contractual obligation.
The loss must be "certain, that is real or actual, rather than merely
' The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed this issue
conjectural."158
on rehearing Corbello.159 The defendants, relying on testimony
given by the plaintiff's expert, argued that the testimony presented
at the trial level failed to rise to the required level of substantiality.
During trial, the witness testified that due to the depth of the aquifer
and the nature of the clay, the "contamination may travel into the
aquifer."16 The witness also stated that Shell's expert agreed in his
deposition that 6it
1 "was possible the drinking source might be
contaminated.,
While the plaintiffs should be entitled to recovery of damages
through indemnificationif the aquifer is actually contaminated and
only if they are required to pay for that damage, they should not be
able to recover for the mere possibility that the aquifer may be
contaminated. The plaintiffs in Corbello provided little evidence
proving certainty of contamination, and the Court admitted that the
damage was only possible. And yet, the Louisiana Supreme Court
found the evidence substantial enough to award the plaintiffs $28
"restoration cost" rule rather than the rule established by Castex. The question
becomes: Is that actually what the parties intended to contract for?
155. See La. Civ. Code art. 1994 ("An obligor is liable for the damages caused
by his failure to perform a conventional obligation. A failure to perform results
from nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in performance.").
156. Litvinoff, supranote 8, §4.8.
157. See Coco v. Richland Gen. Contractors, Inc., 411 So. 2d 1260 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1982); Young v. Dep't of Hospitals, 365 So. 2d 848 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1978).
158. Litvinoff, supra note 8, §4.8.
159. Corbello v. Iowa Production, 2002 -0826 (La. 2003), 850 So. 2d 686, reh'g
granted.
160. Id. at 715.
161. Id.
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1 62
million for the possible contamination of the public aquifer.
Furthermore, assuming that the contamination to the aquifer is
certain, then the appropriate party to receive the full sum of
damages should not be the plaintiffs. The contamination was that
of a public aquifer, and it should be the public that receives
appropriate damages for that contamination or any injury they incur
therefrom.

IV.

GROUND WATER REMEDIATION STATUTE: THE ANSWER TO
THE WINDFALL?

In 2003 the Louisiana legislature passed the "Ground Water
Remediation Statute" 163 to cure the problems caused by the Corbello
decision. The statute allows regulatory agencies, such as the
Department of Environmental Quality, to intervene in the
proceedings and requires the damages for remediation of
contamination or pollution to be paid into the registry of the court.
The statute also requires any money received for restoration for
groundwater remediation to be placed in a fund for the restoration
efforts. The statute partly cures the windfall aspect created by
Corbello,but only as it applies to landowners claiming damages for
contamination of certain types of groundwater.
Lawsuits recently filed in New Iberia in the Avery Island/
Weeks Island Fields and in the Iberia Field have been careful to
avoid claiming the particular class of groundwater that falls under
the statute in their briefs. 1" The careful drafting by attorneys allows
landowners to continue to receive damages far in excess of the fair
165
market value, resulting in more windfalls not cured by the statute.
The statute also fails to consider the possibility of a balancing test
162. Note that the plaintiffs in Corbellohave no duty to perform any remediation
work on the chicot aquifer, leaving the public safety possibly at harm. Id.
163. 2003 La. Acts No. 1166, La. R.S. 2015.1: 30 (2003).
164. See Germany v. Texaco, Inc., No. 101,175, Div. E, 16th Judicial District
Court, Iberia Parish; J. Pauline Duhe v. Texaco, Inc., et al, No. 101,227, Div. E,
16th District, Iberia Parish.
165. See Duhe, No. 101,227, Div. E., 16th District, Iberia Parish, at 11
("Further, Plaintiff herein does not make any judicial demand or claim for the
recovery of damages for the evaluation and remediation of any contamination or
pollution that impacts or threatens to impact "usable ground water," as such term
is defined in La. R.S. 30:2015.1J.(1), as amended by Louisiana Act No.1166 of
2003. The provisions of La. R.S. 30:2015.1 do not apply to this action."); see also
Germany,No. 101,175, Div. E, 16th Judicial District Court, Iberia Parish ("Further,

plaintiffs herein do not make any judicial demand or claim for the recovery of
damages for the evaluation and remediation of any contamination or pollution that
impacts or threatens to impact "usable ground water,"as such term is defined in La.
R.S. 30:2015.1J.(1), as amended by Louisiana Act No. 1166 of 2003.").
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to weigh the costs and benefits of cleanup. Putting a price on
human safety and environmental contamination may seem
impossible, but when excessive costs yield minimal benefits,
restoration damages are unreasonable.
V. RECOMMENDATION

There is a need to ensure that landowners are adequately
compensated, the state's land is kept environmentally clean, the
public remains safe, and the economy of Louisiana continues to
thrive. The best way to accomplish all of these goals is to require
landowners to seek relief with the appropriate regulatory agency,
such as the Department of Natural Resources. There is a great need
in Louisiana for the legislature to draft a statute requiring
landowners to seek such relief first. If they feel the relief granted
is not adequate, then they should turn to the courts. Requiring
landowners to seek relief administratively is the most effective
process for achieving an environmentally clean state, restoring
landowners their land, and making lessees pay reasonable sums of
money to clean the land.
Ifthe issue reaches the courts after administrative relief has been
sought, certain rules should be followed. When a plaintiff requests
damages for a breach of contract resulting in a pecuniary loss to an
individual, the contamination to land, and a potentially dangerous
situation for the public, the court should determine whether
monetary damages, limited to the fair market value of the land, can
adequately restore the plaintiff, the public, and the land. The court
should determine the possibility for substitutes in the marketplace
available to the landowner, the extent of injury to the public, and the
seriousness of contamination of the land. It should also look to the
breaching party's reason for breaching the contract and whether or
not the condition breached was at the heart of the contract. Where
the landowner can be indemnified through monetary damages
limited to the fair market value, that is the maximum award he or
she should receive. Normally, capping the value of the land should
be adequate to place the landowner in the position he occupied prior
to the breach, so that he receives the benefit of the bargain.
If monetary damages are insufficient, for any of these reasons,
the court should award specific performance, overseen by a proper
regulatory agency. First and foremost, an order for specific
performance, in fact, returns the obligee almost perfectly to the
original position. Second, specific performance ensures public
safety. Finally, specific performance returns the land to an
uncontaminated state, rather than allowing Louisiana to suffer the
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consequences of contamination as the case might be if landowners
are left with the decision to restore the land or not.
CONCLUSION

Whether in a common law or a civil law jurisdiction, damages
return the obligee to the position that he would have been in had the
tort not been committed, or had the contract not been breached.
Where there is no non-pecuniary interest, damages should, at the
most, equal the value of the thing and unless punitive, damages do
not punish the obligor. Damages compensate the obligee for injury
actually suffered. They do not compensate one person for another's
injury. When, in Louisiana, the courts choose not to impose
specific performance, the basic principles of damages should be
applied.
The legislature has the duty of protecting the public, and the
environmental regulatory authorities hold the position of enforcing
the legislative directive. There is a need for the legislature and the
regulatory agencies in Louisiana to ensure the public safety and to
clean up environmentally damaged sites. When the courts do not
order specific performance, these are the proper authorities to
impose corrective measures.
On February 25, 2003, the plaintiffs walked away from the
Louisiana Supreme Court, to say the least, overjoyed with the
Court's decision-for their right to a $33 million jackpot had been
solidified. They could purchase a piece of land equivalent to the
original land and still have $32,892,000 to spare. Whether the
plaintiffs decide to use the money to actually restore the land or
invest in a plane ticket to Las Vegas, the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision allowed an enormous windfall. Shell, the public, and the
state of Louisiana pay for that windfall. Shell was forced to pay
inordinate damages for a contract to "reasonably restore" land. The
public was forced to pay, not with money, but potentially with its
safety. And the state of Louisiana pays economically with the
possibility that less companies will enter into leases in Louisiana.
While the conclusion ofthe Louisiana Supreme Court is not without
its benefits-encouraging fulfillment of obligations-the costs
appear to tip the scale.
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